Philosophica 69:41-60 (2002)

Authors
Louis Groarke
St. Francis Xavier University
Leo Groarke
Trent University
Abstract
We argue that Hilary Putnam's pragmatism provides an epistemological perspective which can help us understand--and can positively inform--the development of informal logic.
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References found in this work BETA

Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Pragmatism and Human Flourishing: Putman and Rorty.Amán Rosales Rodríguez - 2005 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 31:127-148.

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