Theory and Decision 44 (1):37-66 (1998)

We generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for strategic form games to allow for ambiguity in the players' expectations. In contrast to other contributions, we model ambiguity by means of so-called lower probability measures or belief functions, which makes it possible to distinguish between a player's assessment of ambiguity and his attitude towards ambiguity. We also generalize the concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate that for certain attitudes towards ambiguity it is possible to explain cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma in a way that is in accordance with some recent experimental findings
Keywords Knightian uncertainty  ambiguity  mixed strategy Nash equilibrium  lower probabilities  belief functions  prisoner's dilemma
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004962423985
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Cooperation in the Prisoni.J. V. Howard - 1988 - Theory and Decision 24 (3):203.

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Non-Additive Beliefs in Solvable Games.Hans Haller - 2000 - Theory and Decision 49 (4):313-338.
The Right to Remain Silent.Joseph Greenberg - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (2):193-204.

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