Paternalism, Disagreements, and The Moral Difference

American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):57-70 (2019)
Authors
Daniel Groll
Carleton College
Abstract
Cases of paternalism usually involve disagreement between the paternalist and the paternalized subject. But not all the disagreements that give rise to paternalism are of the same kind and, as a result, not all instances of paternalism are morally on a par. There is, in other words, a moral difference between different kinds of paternalism, which can be explained in terms of the nature of the disagreements that give rise to the paternalism in the first place. This paper offers a novel account of how to characterize the nature of these disagreements such that we can explain this moral difference.
Keywords paternalism  disagreement  autonomy  soft and hard paternalism  weak and strong paternalism
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