Mind and Language 35 (3):377-389 (2020)

Authors
Steven Gross
Johns Hopkins University
Abstract
Nick Shea’s Representation in Cognitive Science commits him to representations in perceptual processing that are about probabilities. This commentary concerns how to adjudicate between this view and an alternative that locates the probabilities rather in the representational states’ associated “attitudes”. As background and motivation, evidence for probabilistic representations in perceptual processing is adduced, and it is shown how, on either conception, one can address a specific challenge Ned Block has raised to this evidence.
Keywords perception  probability  representation  attitudes  content
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12280
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References found in this work BETA

The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.
Perceptual Confidence.John Morrison - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):15-48.
Visual Confidences and Direct Perceptual Justification.Jessie Munton - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):301-326.

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