Self-restraint and the principle of consent: Some considerations of the liberal conception of political legitmacy [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (1):77-92 (2000)
This article discusses the legitimacy argument on which many liberals ground their demand for restraining the use of religious convictions in processes of political deliberation and decision making. According to this argument the exercise of political power can only be justified by 'neutral' grounds, i.e. grounds that are able to find reciprocal, hypothetical consent. The author argues that this understanding of political legitimacy is not distinctive of the liberal tradition. His thesis is that reciprocal, hypothetical consent is not sufficient and only in a certain, restricted sense necessary for justifying the use of political power.
|Keywords||consent liberalism legitimacy neutrality public deliberation religious convictions self-restraint|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Nicolas Maloberti (2010). The Fallacy of Consent. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (4):469-476.
A. John Simmons (1998). “Denisons” and “Aliens”: Locke's Problem of Political Consent. Social Theory and Practice 24 (2):161-182.
David Archard (2001). Political Disagreement, Legitimacy, and Civility. Philosophical Explorations 4 (3):207 – 222.
Ryan W. Davis (2011). Justice: Metaphysical, After All? [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):207-222.
William A. Edmundson (2011). Consent and Its Cousins. Ethics 121 (2):335-53.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #439,662 of 1,925,045 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #418,130 of 1,925,045 )
How can I increase my downloads?