Authors
Thomas Grundmann
University of Cologne
Abstract
According to Alvin Goldman, reliabilists need to distinguish between uncondi-tionally and conditionally reliable processes. The latter category is used to account for processes such as reasoning or memory. In this paper, I will argue that Gold-man’s account of conditional reliability needs substantial revision in two respects. First, conditional reliability must be reinterpreted in terms of dependent reliability to avoid serious problems. Second, we need a more liberal account that allows dependently reliable processes to operate not only on doxastic but also on non-doxastic input. Thinking this way advances the explanatory power of reliabilism significantly.
Keywords dependent reliability  inference  non-doxastic input  apriori  pictorial memory
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DOI 10.1111/phpr.12811
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References found in this work BETA

Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
The Generality Problem for Reliabilism. E. Conee & R. Feldman - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 89 (1):1-29.
There Is No Knowledge From Falsehood.Ian Schnee - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):53-74.
Knowledge From Falsehood.Ted A. Warfield - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):405–416.
Reliability and Justification.Richard Feldman - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):159-174.

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