In Sven Bernecker, Amy Floweree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Authors
Thomas Grundmann
University of Cologne
Abstract
Disrespect for the truth, the rise of conspiracy thinking, and a pervasive distrust in experts are widespread features of the post-truth condition in current politics and public opinion. Among the many good explanations of these phenomena there is one that is only rarely discussed: that something is wrong with our deeply entrenched intellectual standards of (i) using our own critical thinking without any restriction and (ii) respecting the judgment of every rational agent as epistemically relevant. In this paper, I will argue that these two enlightenment principles—the Principle of Unrestricted Critical Thinking and the Principle of Democratic Reason—not only conflict with what is rationally required from a purely epistemic point of view, but also have bad cognitive consequences in furthering the spread of conspiracy theories and undermining trust in experts. I will then explain in more detail why we should typically defer to experts without using any of our own reasons regarding the subject matter. Moreover, I will show what place this leaves for critical thinking and why it does not have the crazy consequences that the critics expect.
Keywords Epistemic Authority  Post-Truth  Preemption  Advisors  Democratic Reason  Conspiracy Theories  Deference to experts  Political Epistemology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What's Epistemically Wrong with Conspiracy Theorising?Keith Harris - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:235-257.
Expertise and Conspiracy Theories.M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (3):196-208.
Epistemic Deference.Rico Hauswald - forthcoming - Grazer Philosophische Studien:1-39.
Democratic Reason, Democratic Faith, and the Problem of Expertise.Alfred Moore - 2014 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 26 (1-2):101-114.
Democracy and Epistocracy.Paul Gunn - 2014 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 26 (1-2):59-79.
Critical Thinking is Epistemically Responsible.Juho Ritola - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (5):659-678.
Deference Done Right.Richard Pettigrew & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-19.
Epistemic Democracy and the Role of Experts.Cathrine Holst & Anders Molander - 2019 - Contemporary Political Theory 18 (4):541-561.
Conspiracy and Conspiracy Theories in Democratic Politics.Alfred Moore - 2016 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 28 (1):1-23.
Epistemische Deferenz.Rico Hauswald - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (4):436-474.
Conspiracy Theories and Ethics.Juha Räikkä - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 50:651-659.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-05-07

Total views
142 ( #75,981 of 2,454,632 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #20,521 of 2,454,632 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes