Representational parts


Authors
Pete Mandik
William Paterson University of New Jersey
Rick Grush
University of California, San Diego
Abstract
In this reply we claim that, contra Dreyfus, the kinds of skillful performances Dreyfus discusses _are_ representational. We explain this proposal, and then defend it against an objection to the effect that the representational notion we invoke is a weak one countenancing only some global state of an organism as a representation. According to this objection, such a representation is not a robust, projectible property of an organism, and hence will gain no explana- tory leverage in cognitive scientific explanations. We argue on conceptual and empirical grounds that the representations we have identified are not weak unprojectible global states of organisms, but instead genuinely explanatory representational parts of persons
Keywords Philosophy   Phenomenology   Philosophy of Mind   Artificial Intelligence   Interdisciplinary Studies   Developmental Psychology
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1021359808026
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References found in this work BETA

Skill and Spatial Content.Rick Grush - 1998 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (6).
Qualia, Space, and Control.Pete Mandik - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60.

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Citations of this work BETA

Are Minimal Representations Still Representations?1.Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):351-369.
Selective Representing and World-Making.Pete Mandik & Andy Clark - 2002 - Minds and Machines 12 (3):383-395.

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