Synthese 174 (1):47 - 78 (2010)

Authors
Denis Bonnay
Université Paris Nanterre
Abstract
In this paper we compare different models of vagueness viewed as a specific form of subjective uncertainty in situations of imperfect discrimination. Our focus is on the logic of the operator “clearly” and on the problem of higher-order vagueness. We first examine the consequences of the notion of intransitivity of indiscriminability for higher-order vagueness, and compare several accounts of vagueness as inexact or imprecise knowledge, namely Williamson’s margin for error semantics, Halpern’s two-dimensional semantics, and the system we call Centered semantics. We then propose a semantics of degrees of clarity, inspired from the signal detection theory model, and outline a view of higher-order vagueness in which the notions of subjective clarity and unclarity are handled asymmetrically at higher orders, namely such that the clarity of clarity is compatible with the unclarity of unclarity.
Keywords Higher-order vagueness  Clarity  Imperfect discrimination  Inexact knowledge  Non-transitivity  Signal detection theory  Centered semantics  Epistemic logic  Uncertainty  Metacognition
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9684-8
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - London and New York: Routledge.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
The Things We Mean.Stephen R. Schiffer - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Tolerant, Classical, Strict.Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):347-385.
Borel on the Heap.Paul Égré & Anouk Barberousse - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S5):1043-1079.
Vague Judgment: A Probabilistic Account.Paul Égré - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3837-3865.
Metacognitive Perspectives on Unawareness and Uncertainty.Paul Egré & Denis Bonnay - 2012 - In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press. pp. 322.

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