Monizm anomalny i epifenomenalizm

Filozofia Nauki 17 (2) (2009)
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In the text Jaegwon Kim's epiphenomenalist objection to anomalous monism is critically discussed and refuted. The author tries to show that the objection in question originates mainly on the basis of disregarding of Davidsonian ontology - particularly his views on properties and events. The main aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the epiphenomenalist objection does not arise, if we are prepared to take Davidson's ontology seriously



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Mariusz Grygianiec
University of Warsaw

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