The Logical Structure of Stoic Ethics

Apeiron 45 (3):221-237 (2012)
This paper is an attempt to reject the classical interpretation of Stoic ethics as virtue ethics. The typical assumptions of this interpretation, that virtue is the supreme good and that happiness can be reduced to virtue, are questioned. We first lay out the conceptual framework of Stoic philosophy and present an outline of their reduction of happiness to virtue. The main part of the paper provides an argument for reinterpretation of virtue as rationality. In the last part of the paper – more speculative – we argue against the possibility of reduction of happiness to virtue. The main point of the argument is the conceptual incompatibility of the two notions.
Keywords virtue ethics  ancient philosophy
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DOI 10.1515/apeiron-2012-0002
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Railton (1986). Moral Realism. Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
David P. Gauthier (1967). Morality and Advantage. Philosophical Review 76 (4):460-475.

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