Authors
Alex Grzankowski
Birkbeck, University of London
Ray Buchanan
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
How fine-grained are the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes? Are the contents of our beliefs individuated solely in terms of the objects, properties, and relations that figure in their truth conditions, or rather in terms of our concepts, or modes of presentation of those objects, properties, and relations? So-called Millians famously maintain the former whereas their Fregean rivals hold the latter. Though much ink was spilled on the question of grain, relatively little was ever achieved by way of consensus. We think the lack of consensus itself cries out for explanation. In this paper, we sketch a pluralist resolution (or, better, a dissolution) of the debate that flows from some extremely minimal commitments regarding the metaphysics of propositions and the attitudinal relations we bear to them. In doing so, we focus on the Act-type conception of propositions of Hanks (2015) and Soames (2010, 2016) and our own (2019) favored deflationary account, Minimalism.
Keywords propositions  russellian  fregean  act-type propositions
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References found in this work BETA

The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Propositional Content.Peter Hanks - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
What is Meaning?Scott Soames - 2010 - Princeton University Press.

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