Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
AbstractThe view that moods are dispositions has recently fallen into disrepute. In this paper we want to revitalise it by providing a new argument for it and by disarming an important objection against it. A shared assumption of our competitors (intentionalists about moods) is that moods are “diffuse”. First, we will provide reasons for thinking that existing intentionalist views do not in fact capture this distinctive feature of moods that distinguishes them from emotions. Second, we offer a dispositionalist alternative that we think does better. Finally, we disarm the objection that is responsible for dispositionalism’s bad press.
Similar books and articles
Pure Intentionalism About Moods and Emotions.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 135-157.
Dispositionality: Beyond The Biconditionals.David Manley - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):321 - 334.
Why moods change: their appropriateness and connection to beliefs.Tatyana A. Kostochka - 2021 - Synthese 198 (12):11399-11420.
In the Mood for Knowledge : How We Get Knowledge from Moods Expressed in Art.Viktor Emanuelsson - unknown
How is a phenomenology of fundamental moods possible?Tanja Staehler - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):415 – 433.
Intentionalism about Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 57:89-97.
Mood Experience: Implications of a Dispositional Theory of Moods.Matthias Siemer - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):256-263.
The Case Against Representationalism About Moods.Amy Kind - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind.
Dispositional Modality.Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum - 2011 - In C. F. Gethmann (ed.), Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft, Deutsches Jahrbuch Philosophie 2. Meiner Verlag.
Gaining Perspectives on Our Lives: Moods and Aesthetic Experience.Susanne Schmetkamp - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1681-1695.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
No citations found.
References found in this work
Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality.Barbara Vetter - 2015 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.