European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391 (2012)

Authors
Alex Grzankowski
Birkbeck, University of London
Abstract
Most contemporary philosophical discussions of intentionality start and end with a treatment of the propositional attitudes. In fact, many theorists hold that all attitudes are propositional attitudes. Our folk-psychological ascriptions suggest, however, that there are non-propositional attitudes: I like Sally, my brother fears snakes, everyone loves my grandmother, and Rush Limbaugh hates Obama. I argue that things are as they appear: there are non-propositional attitudes. More specifically, I argue that there are attitudes that relate individuals to non-propositional objects and do so not in virtue of relating them to propositions. I reach this conclusion by not only showing that attempted analyses of apparently non-propositional attitudes in terms of the propositional fail, but that some non-propositional attitudes don’t even supervene on propositional attitudes. If this is correct, then the common discussions of intentionality that address only propositional attitudes are incomplete and those who hold that all intentional states are propositional are mistaken
Keywords intentionality  propositional attitudes  non-propositional attitudes
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Reprint years 2012, 2015
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00534.x
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA

Question‐Directed Attitudes.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):145-174.
Attitudes Towards Objects.Alex Grzankowski - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):314-328.
Advantages of Propositionalism.Neil Sinhababu - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):165-180.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

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