Non-Propositional Intentionality

Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2018)
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Abstract

This book explores how our minds represent things in the world, asking whether these representations necessarily have the structure of propositions about the world. The hope is that this will lead towards a more complete understanding of the puzzle of intentionality -- how it is that our minds make contact with the world.

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Author Profiles

Alex Grzankowski
Birkbeck, University of London
Michelle Montague
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Remembering objects.James Openshaw - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22:1–20.
What Acquaintance Teaches.Alex Grzankowski & Michael Tye - 2019 - In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 75–94.
Meaning and Emotion: The Extended Gricean Model and What Emotional Signs Mean.Constant Bonard - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Geneva and University of Antwerp

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