Oxford University Press (2018)

Authors
Michelle Montague
University of Texas at Austin
Alex Grzankowski
Birkbeck, University of London
Abstract
This book explores how our minds represent things in the world, asking whether these representations necessarily have the structure of propositions about the world. The hope is that this will lead towards a more complete understanding of the puzzle of intentionality -- how it is that our minds make contact with the world.
Keywords Intentionality  Propositions  Propositional attitudes  Non-propositional
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ISBN(s) 9780198732570   0198732570
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Perception as a Propositional Attitude.Daniel Kalpokas - forthcoming - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science.
Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Themes From the Philosophy of Lynne Rudder Baker. Oxford, UK: Routledge. pp. 54-74.
Meaning and Emotion.Constant Bonard - 2021 - Dissertation, Université de Genève
What Acquaintance Teaches.Alex Grzankowski & Michael Tye - forthcoming - In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford University Press.

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