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Non-Propositional Intentionality
Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.)
Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2018)
Abstract
This book explores how our minds represent things in the world, asking whether these representations necessarily have the structure of propositions about the world. The hope is that this will lead towards a more complete understanding of the puzzle of intentionality -- how it is that our minds make contact with the world.Author Profiles
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Similar books and articles
Non-propositional intentionality: an introduction.Alex Grzankowski & M. Montague - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague, Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Know-how and non-propositional intentionality.Katalin Farkas - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague, Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 95-113.
A relational theory of non-propositional attitudes.Alex Grzankowski - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague, Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Intensional transitive verbs and abstract clausal complementation.Marcel den Dikken, Richard Larson & Peter Ludlow - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague, Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Is attention a non-propositional attitude?Sebastian Watzl - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague, Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 272-302.
Why maps are not propositional.Elisabeth Camp - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague, Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-45.
Propositionalism Without Propositions, Objectualism Without Objects.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague, Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 214-233.
Not All Attitudes are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.
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Citations of this work
What Acquaintance Teaches.Alex Grzankowski & Michael Tye - 2019 - In Jonathan Knowles & Thomas Raleigh, Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 75–94.
Is Intentionality a Relation? A Dialogue.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2024 - Argumenta 9 (2):337--361.
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