Bargaining power and the evolution of un-fair, non-mutualistic moral norms

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):92 - 93 (2013)
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Abstract

Mutualistic theory explains convincingly the prevalence of fairness norms in small societies of foragers and in large contemporary democratic societies. However, it cannot explain the U-shaped curve of egalitarianism in human history. A theory based on bargaining power is able to provide a more general account and to explain mutualism as a special case. According to this approach, social norms may be more variable and malleable than Baumard et al. suggest

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Francesco Guala
Università degli Studi di Milano

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