European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):366-388 (2012)
I argue that most of the alleged straight solutions to Kripke's Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Paradox can be regarded as the first horn of a dilemma whose second horn is the paradox itself. I then argue that the dilemma is a by-product of an unnecessary foundationalist assumption on the notion of justification and is therefore spurious. Finally, I outline an alternative conception of the justification of linguistic behavior which vindicates some of the insights behind Kripkenstein’s skeptical solution of the paradox.
|Keywords||Rule-following Saul Kripke Ludwig Wittgenstein Meaning scepticism|
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References found in this work BETA
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Citations of this work BETA
Rule-Following, Ideal Conditions and Finkish Dispositions.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):195-209.
Semantic Dispositionalism and Non-Inferential Knowledge.Andrea Guardo - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):749-759.
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