Particularism, Analogy, and Moral Cognition

Minds and Machines 20 (3):385-422 (2010)
Marcello Guarini
University of Windsor
‘Particularism’ and ‘generalism’ refer to families of positions in the philosophy of moral reasoning, with the former playing down the importance of principles, rules or standards, and the latter stressing their importance. Part of the debate has taken an empirical turn, and this turn has implications for AI research and the philosophy of cognitive modeling. In this paper, Jonathan Dancy’s approach to particularism (arguably one of the best known and most radical approaches) is questioned both on logical and empirical grounds. Doubts are raised over whether Dancy’s brand of particularism can adequately explain the graded nature of similarity assessments in analogical arguments. Also, simple recurrent neural network models of moral case classification are presented and discussed. This is done to raise concerns about Dancy’s suggestion that neural networks can help us to understand how we could classify situations in a way that is compatible with his particularism. Throughout, the idea of a surveyable standard—one with restricted length and complexity—plays a key role. Analogical arguments are taken to involve multidimensional similarity assessments, and surveyable contributory standards are taken to be attempts to articulate the dimensions of similarity that may exist between cases. This work will be of relevance both to those who have interests in computationally modeling human moral cognition and to those who are interested in how such models may or may not improve our philosophical understanding of such cognition
Keywords Analogy  Jonathan Dancy  Machine ethics  Moral cognition  Neural networks  Particularism
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DOI 10.1007/s11023-010-9200-4
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References found in this work BETA

Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Blackwell.
Finding Structure in Time.Jeffrey L. Elman - 1990 - Cognitive Science 14 (2):179-211.
A Defense of Abortion.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Particularism and the Role of Imaginary Cases: A Pragmatist Approach.Nate Jackson - 2016 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 8 (1):237-259.
Two Models of Moral Judgment.Shane Bretz & Ron Sun - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (S1):4-37.

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