Economics and Philosophy 35 (3):383-401 (2019)

Authors
Francesco Guala
Università degli Studi di Milano
Abstract
Recent debates on the nature of preferences in economics have typically assumed that they are to be interpreted either as behavioural regularities or as mental states. In this paper I challenge this dichotomy and argue that neither interpretation is consistent with scientific practice in choice theory and behavioural economics. Preferences are belief-dependent dispositions with a multiply realizable causal basis, which explains why economists are reluctant to make a commitment about their interpretation.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s0266267118000512
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,784
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Intransitivity of Preferences.Amos Tversky - 1969 - Psychological Review 76 (1):31-48.

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

In Defence of Revealed Preference Theory.Johanna Thoma - 2021 - Economics and Philosophy 37 (2):163-187.
Functionalism and the Role of Psychology in Economics.Christopher Clarke - 2020 - Journal of Economic Methodology 27 (4):292-310.
On the Individuation of Choice Options.Roberto Fumagalli - 2020 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 50 (4):338-365.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Mistakes About Preferences in the Social Sciences.Daniel M. Hausman - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (1):3-25.
The Origins of Behavioural Public Policy.Adam Oliver - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
Mental Causation, Compatibilism and Counterfactuals.Dwayne Moore - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):20-42.
The Human Agent in Behavioural Finance: A Searlean Perspective.Philip Faulkner - 2002 - Journal of Economic Methodology 9 (1):31-52.
Mechanism in Behavioural Economics.Michael Joffe - 2019 - Journal of Economic Methodology 26 (3):228-242.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-10-18

Total views
24 ( #461,610 of 2,462,978 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #223,428 of 2,462,978 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes