Rule-following, ideal conditions and finkish dispositions

Philosophical Studies 157 (2):195-209 (2012)
Abstract
This paper employs some outcomes (for the most part due to David Lewis) of the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of dispositions to evaluate those dispositional analyses of meaning that make use of the concept of a disposition in ideal conditions. The first section of the paper explains why one may find appealing the notion of an ideal-condition dispositional analysis of meaning and argues that Saul Kripke’s well-known argument against such analyses is wanting. The second section focuses on Lewis’ work in the metaphysics of dispositions in order to call attention to some intuitions about the nature of dispositions that we all seem to share. In particular, I stress the role of what I call "Actuality Constraint". The third section of the paper maintains that the Actuality Constraint can be used to show that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify my meaning addition by "+" do not exist (in so doing, I develop a suggestion put forward by Paul Boghossian). This immediately implies that ideal-condition dispositional analyses of meaning cannot work. The last section discusses a possible objection to my argument. The point of the objection is that the argument depends on an illicit assumption. I show (1) that, in fact, the assumption in question is far from illicit and (2) that even without this assumption it is possible to argue that the dispositions with which ideal-condition dispositional analyses identify my meaning addition by "+" do not exist.
Keywords Rule-following  Ideal conditions  Dispositions  Finks  Saul Kripke  David Lewis
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9632-y
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Finkish Dispositions.David Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
How to Speak of the Colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Dispositions and Conditionals.C. B. Martin - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Dispositions, Rules and Finks.A. Bird & T. Handfield - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):285-98.
Dispositions, Rules, and Finks.Toby Handfield & Alexander Bird - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):285 - 298.
Lewis on Finkish Dispositions.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):703 - 710.
Meaning, Dispositions, and Normativity.Josefa Toribio - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (3):399-413.
Finkish Dispositions.David Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
Dispositions and Antidotes.Alexander Bird - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):227-234.
Meaning Skepticism and Normativity.Martin Montminy - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:215-235.
Unfinkable Dispositions.Toby Handfield - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):297 - 308.
Causation, Laws and Dispositions.Andreas Hüttemann - 2007 - In Max Kistler & Bruno Gnassounou (eds.), Dispositions and Causal Powers. Ashgate.
Superficial Dispositionalism.Lauren Ashwell - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):635-653.
Dispositions and Subjunctives.Jesse R. Steinberg - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):323 - 341.
In Defence of Causal Bases.Jan Hauska - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):23 – 43.
Multi‐Track Dispositions.Barbara Vetter - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):330-352.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-10-07

Total downloads

403 ( #5,710 of 2,152,648 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

49 ( #5,038 of 2,152,648 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums