Synthese 190 (15):3107-3122 (2013)

Authors
Francesco Guala
Università degli Studi di Milano
Abstract
David Lewis famously proposed to model conventions as solutions to coordination games, where equilibrium selection is driven by precedence, or the history of play. A characteristic feature of Lewis Conventions is that they are intrinsically non-normative. Some philosophers have argued that for this reason they miss a crucial aspect of our folk notion of convention. It is doubtful however that Lewis was merely analysing a folk concept. I illustrate how his theory can (and must) be assessed using empirical data, and argue that it does indeed miss an important aspect of real-world conventions
Keywords Conventions  Social norms  Game theory  Experiment
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-012-0131-x
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Walking the Tightrope: Unrecognized Conventions and Arbitrariness.Megan Henricks Stotts - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (8):867-887.

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