Appropriately Using People Merely as a Means

Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):777-794 (2016)
Authors
Alex Guerrero
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
There has been a great deal of philosophical discussion about using people, using people intentionally, using people as a means to some end, and using people merely as a means to some end. In this paper, I defend the following claim about using people: NOT ALWAYS WRONG: using people—even merely as a means—is not always morally objectionable. Having defended that claim, I suggest that the following claim is also correct: NO ONE FEATURE: when it is morally objectionable to use people, this is for many different kinds of reasons—there is no one wrong-making feature that every morally objectionable using has in common. After discussing these claims, I use them to present and motivate what I call the “precaution” theory of norms against using people. I conclude by considering a few cases from the criminal law context—cases that are naturally described as using people—to assess the moral appropriateness of this kind of use in these cases, and to demonstrate how the theory applies to the real world.
Keywords Using people  Deontology  Arrest quotas  Kantian ethics  Derek Parfit  Consequentialism  use  treating as a means  mere means  merely as a means
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11572-014-9346-x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 33,741
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-11-27

Total downloads
75 ( #82,153 of 2,263,077 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #53,537 of 2,263,077 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature