Nicolás Lo Guercio
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
The debate over the epistemology of desagreement is full of disagreements. However, both conciliationists and steadfasts agree on the following thesis: once I have taken into account the disagreement with an epistemic peer P1, that is, once I have revised my belief in light of my knowledge of such disagreement, finding a new disagreement with another peer, P2, does not require that I revise my belief again if P2 is epistemically dependent on P1. In short: the number of disagreements doesn’t matter when there is epistemic dependence. This article addresses the problem from a new perspective. First, I will briefly present my view concerning peer disagreement, which distinguishes between weak peer disagreements and strong peer disagreements. Then, I will argue that strong peer disagreements do not call for a doxastic revision, whether the new disagreeing peers are epistemically dependent or not. Second, I develop the idea of epistemic dependence. Finally, I contend that in the case of weak peer disagreements, when they are epistemically independent the discovery of disagreements with new epistemic peers calls for a doxastic revision.
Keywords Disagreement   Epistemic Peerhood   Epistemic Dependence
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DOI 10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n3p325
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