The Impossibility of Supererogation in Kant's Moral Theory

It is common to think that certain acts are supererogatory, especially certain heroic or saintly self-sacrifices for the good. The idea seems to have an ordinary and clear application. Nothing shows this better than the well-known cases which J. O. Urmson adduced. Urmson argued that no major moral theory could give a proper account of the supererogatory character of such acts, and that therefore none could account for "all the facts of morality," as he put it. But his arguments were sketchy. This paper shall show, in some detail, that he was essentially right about Kant's moral theory, and that the criticism goes deep and holds up against recent sympathetic interpretation of Kant's views of duty and worth
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.2307/2653784
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Kant on Virtue.Claus Dierksmeier - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 113 (4):597-609.
Disjunctive Duties and Supererogatory Sets of Actions.Matthias Brinkmann - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77:67-86.
Kant's Sacrificial Turns.Paolo Diego Bubbio - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (2):97-115.

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