Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):348-366 (2000)
The traditional theistic philosopher is committed to hold that God has a perfect will essentially, and that this is better than having a free will. It will be argued that God, being omnipotent, would have the power to create creatures who also have a perfect will essentially. This creates a problem for the traditional theist in solving the problem of moral evil. The problem of actual moral evil will not then be solvable by reference to the value of our moral freedom, in accordance with the Free Will Defense. This favors the view that moral freedom is an excellence in both man and God
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Plantingian Theism and the Free-Will Defence.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2016 - Religious Studies 52 (4):451-460.
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