Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):348-366 (2000)

Abstract
The traditional theistic philosopher is committed to hold that God has a perfect will essentially, and that this is better than having a free will. It will be argued that God, being omnipotent, would have the power to create creatures who also have a perfect will essentially. This creates a problem for the traditional theist in solving the problem of moral evil. The problem of actual moral evil will not then be solvable by reference to the value of our moral freedom, in accordance with the Free Will Defense. This favors the view that moral freedom is an excellence in both man and God
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 0739-7046
DOI 10.5840/faithphil200017323
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References found in this work BETA

Must God Create the Best?Robert Merrihew Adams - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (3):317-332.
Duty and Divine Goodness.Thomas V. Morris - 1984 - American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (3):261 - 268.

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Citations of this work BETA

Divine Freedom and Free Will Defenses.W. Paul Franks - 2015 - Heythrop Journal 56 (1):108-119.
Plantingian Theism and the Free-Will Defence.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2016 - Religious Studies 52 (4):451-460.
The Free Will Defense Revisited: The Instrumental Value of Significant Free Will.Frederick Choo & Esther Goh - 2019 - International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science (4):32-45.

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