Consciousness and intentionality: Robots with and without the right stuff

In C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Language, Logic, and Mind. CSLI Publications (1990)
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Keith Gunderson
University of Minnesota
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