Intersubstitutivity principles and the generalization function of truth

Synthese 195 (3):1065-1075 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich’s response to the Liar paradox—more specifically, of his move to preserve classical logic. Horwich’s response requires that the full intersubstitutivity of ‘ ‘A’ is true’ and A be abandoned. It is thus open to the objection, due to Hartry Field, that it undermines the generalization function of truth. We defend Horwich’s move by isolating the grade of intersubstitutivity required by the generalization function and by providing a new reading of the biconditionals of the form “ ‘A’ is true iff A.”

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 96,235

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On Horwich's way out.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):175-177.
Horwich and the Generalization Problem.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2004 - Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium:187-189.
McGee on Horwich.Ryan Christensen - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):205-218.
Horwich and Semantic Epistemicism.Sergi Oms - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 53:99-103.
A revenge-immune solution to the semantic paradoxes.Hartry Field - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):139-177.
Davidson’s Objection to Horwich’s Minimalism about Truth.Kirk Ludwig - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):429-437.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-16

Downloads
98 (#184,591)

6 months
20 (#199,282)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Shawn Standefer
National Taiwan University
Anil Gupta
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

The Final Cut.Elia Zardini - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (6):1583-1611.
Unrevisability.Christopher S. Hill - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3015-3031.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Philosophy of logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Edited by Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
Pursuit of truth.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1990 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 15 references / Add more references