Minds and Machines 28 (4):775-785 (2018)

David Gurney
University of Arizona
I use a hypothetical case study of a woman who replaces here biological arms with prostheses controlled through a brain–computer interface the explore how a BCI might interpret and misinterpret intentions. I define pre-veto intentions and post-veto intentions and argue that a failure of a BCI to differentiate between the two could lead to some troubling legal and ethical problems.
Keywords intentions  human enhancement  applied ethics
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DOI 10.1007/s11023-018-9462-9
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References found in this work BETA

Two Faces of Intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.
Proximal Intentions, Intention-Reports, and Vetoing.Alfred Mele - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):1 – 14.

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