The Principle Based Explanations Are Not Extinct in Cognitive Science: The Case of the Basic Level Effects

Philosophia Scientae 18:203-214 (2014)
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Lilia Gurova
New Bulgarian University

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References found in this work

Explanation: a mechanist alternative.William Bechtel & Adele Abrahamsen - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):421-441.
Constructing a Philosophy of Science of Cognitive Science.William Bechtel - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (3):548-569.
The Joint Account of Mechanistic Explanation.Melinda Bonnie Fagan - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (4):448-472.
How shall a thing be called?Roger Brown - 1958 - Psychological Review 65 (1):14-21.

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