Conflicting reasons in the small-improvement argument

Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):754-763 (2010)

Nicolas Espinoza
Stockholm University
Johan E. Gustafsson
University of York
The small-improvement argument is usually considered the most powerful argument against comparability, viz the view that for any two alternatives an agent is rationally required either to prefer one of the alternatives to the other or to be indifferent between them. We argue that while there might be reasons to believe each of the premises in the small-improvement argument, there is a conflict between these reasons. As a result, the reasons do not provide support for believing the conjunction of the premises. Without support for the conjunction of the premises, the small-improvement argument for incomparability fails.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.648.x
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