Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):754-763 (2010)

Authors
Nicolas Espinoza
Stockholm University
Johan E. Gustafsson
University of York
Abstract
The small-improvement argument is usually considered the most powerful argument against comparability, viz the view that for any two alternatives an agent is rationally required either to prefer one of the alternatives to the other or to be indifferent between them. We argue that while there might be reasons to believe each of the premises in the small-improvement argument, there is a conflict between these reasons. As a result, the reasons do not provide support for believing the conjunction of the premises. Without support for the conjunction of the premises, the small-improvement argument for incomparability fails.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.648.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Possibility of Parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
Value Relations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2008 - Theoria 74 (1):18-49.
The Small Improvement Argument.Nicolas Espinoza - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):127 - 139.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Normative Decision Theory.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):755-772.
Value Relations Revisited.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2012 - Economics and Philosophy 28 (2):133-164.
Decision Making in the Face of Parity.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):263-277.
On Locating Value in Making Moral Progress.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (1):137-152.

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