Locke Studies 10:113-129 (2010)
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John Locke’s account of personal identity is usually thought to have been proved false by Thomas Reid’s simple ‘Gallant Officer’ argument. Locke is traditionally interpreted as holding that your having memories of a past person’s thoughts or actions is necessary and sufficient for your being identical to that person. This paper argues that the traditional memory interpretation of Locke’s account is mistaken and defends a memory continuity view according to which a sequence of overlapping memories is necessary and sufficient for personal identity. On this view Locke is not vulnerable to the Gallant Officer argument.
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References found in this work BETA
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid & A. D. Woozley - 1942 - Philosophy 17 (66):189-190.
Locke on Personal Identity.Kenneth Winkler - 1991 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 (2):201-226.
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Citations of this work BETA
Non-Branching Personal Persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329.
A Objeção de Thomas Reid À Teoria Lockiana da Identidade Pessoal.Vinícius França Freitas - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (1):147-164.
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2010-10-14
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277 ( #38,196 of 2,499,672 )
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