Abstract
Four groups of intentional action sentences can be distinguished. An intentional action sentence belongs in a given group as a consequence of the range of intentions, i.e. it may record an action in which someone intends that he should intentionally do something in a particular manner, for a particular purpose, to a particular object, or it may record an action in which someone intends that he should intentionally do something though he intends no particular manner or no manner at all and intends no particular object. Thus the range of intention affects entailments, compatibility and inconsistency among intentional action sentences. A fragment of a theory of the range of intentions is set out and some of its implications are examined
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DOI 10.1080/00201747508601751
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References found in this work BETA

The Logical Form of Action Sentences.Donald Davidson - 1967 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 81--95.
The Structure of Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (19):633-647.
A Semantic Theory of Adverbs.Richmond Thomason & Robert Stalnaker - 1973 - Linguistic Inquiry 4 (2):195-220.

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