Value-Preference Symmetry and Fitting-Attitude Accounts of Value Relations

Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):476-491 (2013)
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Abstract

Joshua Gert and Wlodek Rabinowicz have developed frameworks for value relations that are rich enough to allow for non-standard value relations such as parity. Yet their frameworks do not allow for any non-standard preference relations. In this paper, I shall defend a symmetry between values and preferences, namely, that for every value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation, and vice versa. I claim that if the arguments that there are non-standard value relations are cogent, these arguments, mutatis mutandis, also show that there are non-standard preference relations. Hence frameworks of Gert and Rabinowicz's type are either inadequate since there are cogent arguments for both non-standard value and preference relations and these frameworks deny this, or they lack support since the arguments for non-standard value relations are unconvincing. Instead, I propose a simpler framework that allows for both non-standard value and preference relations.

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Johan E. Gustafsson
University of Texas at Austin

References found in this work

The possibility of parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
Brentano and the Buck-Passers.Sven Danielsson & Jonas Olson - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):511 - 522.
Value relations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2008 - Theoria 74 (1):18-49.
Value and parity.Joshua Gert - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):492-510.

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