Richard Swinburne's argument to the simplicity of God via the infinite

Religious Studies 45 (4):487-493 (2009)
Abstract
In ’The Coherence of Theism’ Richard Swinburne writes that a person cannot be omniscient and perfectly free. In ’The Existence of God’ Swinburne writes that God is a person who is omniscient and perfectly free. There is a straightforward reason why the two passages are not in tension, but recognition of this reason raises a problem for Swinburne’s argument in ’The Existence of God’ (the conclusion of which is that God likely exists). In this paper I present the problem for Swinburne’s argument. I then consider two potential responses and suggest that neither succeeds
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DOI 10.1017/S0034412509990217
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