Sophia 48 (4):393-398 (2009)

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Abstract
Swinburne relies on principle P in The Existence of God to argue that God is simple and thus likely to exist. In this paper, I argue that Swinburne does not support P. In particular, his arguments from mathematical simplicity and scientists’ preferences both fail. Given the central role P plays in Swinburne’s overall argument in The Existence of God , I conclude that Swinburne should further support P if his argument that God likely exists is to be persuasive.
Keywords Swinburne  Simplicity  Infinite  God
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DOI 10.1007/s11841-009-0111-x
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Justification.Richard Swinburne - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Simplicity as Evidence of Truth.Richard Swinburne - 1997 - Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Swinburne's Explanation of the Universe. [REVIEW]Quentin Smith - 1998 - Religious Studies 34 (1):91-102.

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