Zalan Gyenis
Jagiellonian University
Miklós Rédei
London School of Economics
The classical interpretation of probability together with the principle of indifference is formulated in terms of probability measure spaces in which the probability is given by the Haar measure. A notion called labelling invariance is defined in the category of Haar probability spaces; it is shown that labelling invariance is violated, and Bertrand’s paradox is interpreted as the proof of violation of labelling invariance. It is shown that Bangu’s attempt to block the emergence of Bertrand’s paradox by requiring the re-labelling of random events to preserve randomness cannot succeed non-trivially. A non-trivial strategy to preserve labelling invariance is identified, and it is argued that, under the interpretation of Bertrand’s paradox suggested in the paper, the paradox does not undermine either the principle of indifference or the classical interpretation and is in complete harmony with how mathematical probability theory is used in the sciences to model phenomena. It is shown in particular that violation of labelling invariance does not entail that labelling of random events affects the probabilities of random events. It also is argued, however, that the content of the principle of indifference cannot be specified in such a way that it can establish the classical interpretation of probability as descriptively accurate or predictively successful. 1 The Main Claims2 The Elementary Classical Interpretation of Probability3 The General Classical Interpretation of Probability in Terms of Haar Measures4 Labelling Invariance and Labelling Irrelevance5 General Bertrand’s Paradox6 Attempts to Save Labelling Invariance7 Comments on the Classical Interpretation of Probability.
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Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1093/bjps/axt036
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References found in this work BETA

The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.
Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Treatise on Probability.J. M. Keynes - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):219-222.
Conditional Probability in the Light of Qualitative Belief Change.David C. Makinson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):121 - 153.

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Bertrand’s Paradox and the Maximum Entropy Principle.Nicholas Shackel & Darrell P. Rowbottom - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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