Capgras delusion: An interactionist model

Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):863-876 (2008)
Abstract
In this paper I discuss the role played by disturbed phenomenology in accounting for the formation and maintenance of the Capgras delusion. Whilst endorsing a two-stage model to explain the condition, I nevertheless argue that traditional accounts prioritise the role played by some form of second-stage cognitive disruption at the expense of the significant contribution made by the patient’s disturbed phenomenology, which is often reduced to such uninformative descriptions as “anomalous” or “strange”. By advocating an interactionist model, I argue that the delusional belief constitutes an attempt on the part of the patient to explain his/her initially odd and somewhat disturbed phenomenal content and, moreover, that the delusion then structures the patient’s experience such that what he/she perceives is an impostor. This fact is used to explain the delusional belief’s maintenance and resistance to revision. Thus, whilst accepting that second-stage cognitive disruption has a part to play in explaining the Capgras delusion, the emphasis here is placed on the role played by the patient’s changing phenomenal content and its congruence with the delusional belief. Unlike traditional two-stage models, which posit a unidirectional progression from experience to belief, the interactionist model advocates a two-way interaction between bottom-up and top-down processes. The application of this model to other delusional beliefs is also considered
Keywords info:mesh/Recognition (Psychology)  info:mesh/Cognition Disorders  info:mesh/Humans  info:mesh/Capgras Syndrome  info:mesh/Delusions  info:mesh/Face  info:mesh/Interpersonal Relations  Face   Humans   Delusions   Interpersonal Relations   Recognition (Psychology)   Cognition Disorders   Capgras Syndrome   Culture  info:mesh/Culture
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2008.01.006
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References found in this work BETA
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & N. Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.
Rationality, Meaning, and the Analysis of Delusion.J. Campbell - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.

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Citations of this work BETA
Can We Recreate Delusions in the Laboratory?Lisa Bortolotti, Rochelle Cox & Amanda Barnier - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):109 - 131.
The Capgras Delusion: An Integrated Approach.Neralie Wise - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):183-205.

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