Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):26-26 (1997)

Abstract
Glenberg argues for embodied representations relevant to action. In contrast, we propose a grouping of representations, not necessarily all being directly embodied. Without assuming the existence of representations that are not directly embodied, one cannot account for the use of knowledge abstracted from direct experience.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x97300016
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