Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104 (2019)
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Abstract

The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise position—the interrogative capacity view—which claims that knowing how to do something is a certain kind of ability to generate answers to the question of how to do it. This view combines the intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a relation to a set of propositions with the anti-intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of ability. I argue that this view combines the positive features of both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism.

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Joshua Habgood-Coote
University of Leeds

References found in this work

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Action, Knowledge, and Will.John Hyman - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Know How.Jason Stanley - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
[Letter from Gilbert Ryle].Gilbert Ryle - 1932 - Philosophy 7 (26):250 -.

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