Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104 (2019)

Authors
Joshua Habgood-Coote
University of Bristol
Abstract
The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise position—the interrogative capacity view—which claims that knowing how to do something is a certain kind of ability to generate answers to the question of how to do it. This view combines the intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a relation to a set of propositions with the anti-intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of ability. I argue that this view combines the positive features of both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism.
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2018.1434550
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References found in this work BETA

Know How.Jason Stanley - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Action, Knowledge, and Will.John Hyman - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
Know-How and Gradability.Carlotta Pavese - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):345-383.

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Citations of this work BETA

Knowing How.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Analysis Current Issue 79 (3):487-503.
Concepts and Action. Know-How and Beyond.David Löwenstein - forthcoming - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion. New Essays. London, Ontario, Kanada:
The Face‐Value Theory, Know‐That, Know‐Wh and Know‐How.Giulia Felappi - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):63-72.

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