Knowledge-how is the norm of intention

Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727 (2018)
Abstract
It is a widely shared intuition that there is a close connection between knowledge-how and intentional action. In this paper, I explore one aspect of this connection: the normative connection between intending to do something and knowing how to do it. I argue for a norm connecting knowledge-how and intending in a way that parallels the knowledge norms of assertion, belief, and practical reasoning, which I call the knowledge-how norm of Intention. I argue that this norm can appeal to support from arguments which parallel those for other epistemic norms, that it can deal with a number of prima facie problem cases, and that alternative conditions in a norm on intention are implausible.
Keywords Knowledge-how  Epistemic Norms  Intention  Bratman
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-0931-4
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

View all 68 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Knowledge Norms.Matthew A. Benton - 2014 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:nn-nn.
Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - In C. Littlejohn & J. Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press.
XV-The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
Knowledge and Attributability.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):329-350.
Knowledge Norms and Acting Well.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):49-55.
XV—The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
Sosa on Knowledge, Assertion and Value.Christoph Kelp - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):229-237.
In What Sense is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion?Pascal Engel - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):45-59.
Is There an Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning?Davide Fassio - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2137-2166.
No Epistemic Norm for Action.SImion Mona - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
Assertion, Practical Reasoning, and Epistemic Separabilism.Kenneth Boyd - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1907-1927.
Added to PP index
2017-05-21

Total downloads
81 ( #74,489 of 2,237,285 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
38 ( #10,974 of 2,237,285 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature