Synthese 195 (8):3597-3620 (2018)

Authors
Joshua Habgood-Coote
University of Bristol
Abstract
In this paper I consider the prospects for an epistemic norm which relates knowledge-how to showing in a way that parallels the knowledge norm of assertion. In the first part of the paper I show that this epistemic norm can be motivated by conversational evidence, and that it fits in with a plausible picture of the function of knowledge. In the second part of the paper I present a dilemma for this norm. If we understand showing in a broad sense as a general kind of skill teaching, then the norm faces counterexamples of teachers who know how to teach, but not to do. On the other hand, it we understand showing more narrowly as involving only teaching by doing the relevant activity, then the data which initially supported the norm can be explained away by more general connections between knowledge-how and intentional action.
Keywords Knowledge-how  Showing  Epistemic Norms  Knowledge Norms
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-017-1389-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.

View all 83 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What's the Point of Knowing How?Joshua Habgood‐Coote - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):693-708.
Knowledge-How is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

No Epistemic Norm for Action.SImion Mona - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):231-238.
The Epistemic Norm of Blame.D. Justin Coates - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):457-473.
XV—The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account.Neil Mehta - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):681-705.
Is There an Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning?Davide Fassio - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2137-2166.
Knowledge Norms.Matthew A. Benton - 2014 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:nn-nn.
Clifford and the Common Epistemic Norm.Robin McKenna - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (3):245-258.
Assertion, Practical Reasoning, and Epistemic Separabilism.Kenneth Boyd - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1907-1927.
Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):897-908.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-04-03

Total views
180 ( #52,012 of 2,403,526 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
35 ( #23,489 of 2,403,526 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes