Abstract

Catharine MacKinnon makes it clear that she believes there is an important and close connection between her epistemological views and her theory of gender. What remains unclear, however, are: the content of MacKinnon's epistemological views, the nature of the connection that purportedly holds between those views and her theory of gender, and whether or not MacKinnon is right to posit such a connection. The aim of this writing is, therefore, three-fold. First, I explain MacKinnon's "feminist epistemology" and her theory of gender. Second, I unearth from MacKinnon's philosophically murky discussion a two-pronged argument against "representational" epistemology and in favor of "hermeneutics." And finally, I argue that, even when rendered in their strongest form, MacKinnon's epistemological considerations fail to link up meaningfully with her theory of gender. Presenting considerations strikingly similar to those raised by Richard Rorty in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, MacKinnon argues that abandoning representational epistemology and embracing "feminist epistemology" both dissolves a vexing philosophical puzzle and creates a more receptive space in political debate for the voices of oppressed groups . There is a small, though growing, cadre of thinkers persuaded by the sorts of philosophical considerations raised by MacKinnon. It is not belief in the soundness of such purely philosophical considerations, however, that primarily motivates MacKinnon's commitment to "feminist epistemology." Rather, it is MacKinnon's conviction that such an epistemology has advantageous political consequences for women. I can find no ground for thinking, however, that advantageous political repercussions would be forthcoming for women should representational epistemology be abandoned and MacKinnon's feminist epistemology widely embraced. MacKinnon's over-arching goal is the liberation of women from sexist oppression, and she regards the popular acceptance of her theory of gender as an important step toward that goal. By complicating her discussion of gender with discussion of irrelevant epistemological issues, MacKinnon hinders rather than assists progress toward her over-arching objective. Accordingly, I conclude that MacKinnon would have done well to excise all discussion of epistemology from her work