Davidson on first-person authority

Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):285-304 (1997)
Abstract
Davidson’s explanation of first‐person authority in utterance of sentences of the form ‘I V that p’ derives first‐person authority from the requirements of interpretation of speech. His account is committed to the view that utterance sentences are truth‐bearers, that believing that p is a matter of holding true an utterance sentence, and that a speaker’s knowledge of what he means gives him knowledge of what belief he expresses by his utterance. These claims are here faulted. His explanation of first‐person authority by reference to the requirements of interpretability is committed to the view that all understanding involves interpretation. This is argued to be a misconception of understanding and of speaker’s meaning. Davidson’s account involves acceptance of the cognitive assumption that normally when a person Vs that p, he knows that he does. This assumption is challenged. Throughout, Davidson’s conception is compared and contrasted with Wittgenstein’s
Keywords Authority  Belief  Epistemology  Intentionality  Knowledge  Davidson, D
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00060
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,370
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Papers.J. L. Austin - 1961 - Oxford University Press.
First Person Authority.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Dialectica 38 (2‐3):101-112.
The Structure and Content of Truth.Donald Davidson - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (6):279-328.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Nonsense Made Intelligible.Hans-Johann Glock - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):111-136.
Davidson and First-Person Authority: Parataxis and Self-Expression.Rockney Jacobsen - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):251-266.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Self-Knowledge Failures and First Person Authority.Mark McCullagh - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):365-380.
Davidson on First-Person Authority and Externalism.Sven Bernecker - 1996 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):121-139.
Davidson and First-Person Authority: Parataxis and Self-Expression.Rockney Jacobsen - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):251-266.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
87 ( #61,713 of 2,193,769 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #145,873 of 2,193,769 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature