Erkenntnis 79 (S7):1271-1288 (2014)

P. M. S. Hacker
Oxford University
Two different conceptions of language dominate philosophical reflection on the nature of human language and of human linguistic powers. The first is the conception of language as a calculus of meaning, and of understanding as computational interpretation. This conception is rooted in the exigencies of function-theoretic logic. The notions pivotal to this conception are truth, truth-condition, sense and force, naming and describing (representation), and theory of meaning for natural languages. The alternative conception is an anthropological one, which conceives of language above all as a form of human communicative behaviour, constituted by human practices and manifest in human action. The notions pivotal to this conception are practice, language-game, use and rule of use as given by explanations of meaning, understanding and criteria of understanding. The fundamental principles that inform each of these conceptions are explained. The radical flaws of calculus conceptions of language are laid bare
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9558-9
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References found in this work BETA

The Basic Laws of Arithmetic.Gottlob Frege - 1964 - Berkeley: University of California Press.
„What is a Theory of Meaning?(I)” In: Guttenplan, S.Michael Dummett - 1975 - In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Clarendon Press.
Compound Thoughts.Gottlob Frege - 1963 - Mind 72 (285):1-17.

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