Possibility, Necessity, and Logical Truth

Analysis 38 (4):182 - 186 (1978)
An earlier article by the author, "quine and strawson on logical theory" ("analysis" volume 34, pages 207-208), is expanded and defended against criticisms made by charles sayward in "the province of logic" ("analysis" volume 36, pages 47-48). it is shown that quine's definition of logical truth presupposes an understanding of "possibility," even if the term 'sentence' is used set-theoretically, and that if quine is allowed the concept of "possibility," then strawson must be allowed modal concepts for his purposes. the traditional claim that an argument is valid if and only if the corresponding conditional is necessary is also defended
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DOI 10.1093/analys/38.4.182
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