Kant-Studien 73 (1-4):425-439 (1982)
Frege's semantics of sense and reference and two husserlian alternatives are discussed. it is shown that husserl neither took his semantics of sense and reference from frege nor abandoned psychologism under his influence. frege's arguments on behalf of his choice of truth values as the reference of statements and of concepts as the reference of conceptual words are submitted to criticism. some algebraic considerations are sketched in the last part of the article
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Husserl's Relevance for the Philosophy and Foundations of Mathematics.E. Rosado Haddock Guillermo - 1997 - Axiomathes 8 (1):125-142.
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