Anomalous control: When "free will" is not conscious

Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):646-654 (2004)
Abstract
The conscious feeling of exercising ‘free-will’ is fundamental to our sense of self. However, in some psychopathological conditions actions may be experienced as involuntary or unwilled. We have used suggestion in hypnosis to create the experience of involuntariness in normal participants. We compared a voluntary finger movement, a passive movement and a voluntary movement suggested by hypnosis to be ‘involuntary.’ Hypnosis itself had no effect on the subjective experience of voluntariness associated with willed movements and passive movements or on time estimations of their occurrence. However, subjective time estimates of a hypnotically-suggested, ‘involuntary’ finger movement were more similar to those for passive movements than for voluntary movements. The experience of anomalous control is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the normal conscious experience of a similar act produced intentionally. The experience of anomalous control may be produced either by pathology, or, in our case, by suggestion
Keywords *Consciousness States  *Motor Processes  *Self Perception  *Volition
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2004.06.001
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References found in this work BETA
Hypnosis and Consciousness: A Structural Model.David A. Oakley - 1999 - Contemporary Hypnosis 16:215-223.

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Citations of this work BETA
Hypnotic Suggestion and Cognitive Neuroscience.David A. Oakley & Peter W. Halligan - 2009 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (6):264-270.
What Are Self-Generated Actions?Friederike Schüür & Patrick Haggard - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1697-1704.
Can We Recreate Delusions in the Laboratory?Lisa Bortolotti, Rochelle Cox & Amanda Barnier - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):109 - 131.
Hypnosis and the Death of "Subjective Backwards Referral".Susan Pockett - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):621-25.

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