Abstract

A basic feature of Aristotle's theory of action is a distinction between energeiai and kineseis. Roughly speaking, kineseis are goal-oriented processes such as learning something or building a house. Energeiai, on the other hand, are activities like contemplating and seeing which are not process-like and are not directed primarily toward ends other than themselves. The present thesis attempts to locate this distinction within the broader context of Aristotle's system as a whole. Following a review of various interpretations of the distinction, it analyzes the concepts of energeia and kinesis as each appears in Aristotle's writings. The key to both is found to be the role of the telos or end. Once the two have been treated separately, their joint contribution to human action is described, along with their connection with Aristotle's notion of praxis. Finally, the last chapter discusses the development of the energeia-kinesis distinction in the course of Aristotle's career, from its roots in such early works as the Topics and Protrepticus to its later applications in Aristotle's psychology and ethics. Aristotle's increased appreciation of the distinction is shown to be connected with his teleology