The Burden of Proof and Its Role in Argumentation

Argumentation 21 (1):39-61 (2007)
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Abstract

The notion of “the burden of proof” plays an important role in real-world argumentation contexts, in particular in law. It has also been given a central role in normative accounts of argumentation, and has been used to explain a range of classic argumentation fallacies. We argue that in law the goal is to make practical decisions whereas in critical discussion the goal is frequently simply to increase or decrease degree of belief in a proposition. In the latter case, it is not necessarily important whether that degree of belief exceeds a particular threshold (e.g., ‘reasonable doubt’). We explore the consequences of this distinction for the role that the “burden of proof” has played in argumentation and in theories of fallacy.

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References found in this work

Fallacies.Charles Leonard Hamblin - 1970 - London, England: Vale Press.
A Practical Study of Argument.Trudy Govier - 1985 - Belmont, CA, USA: Wadsworth Pub. Co..
Fallacies.C. L. Hamblin - 1970 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 160:492-492.

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