Invisible fences of the moral domain

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):552-553 (2005)
Abstract
Crossing the border into the moral domain changes moral thinking in two ways: (1) the facts at hand become “anthropocentric” facts not easily open to revision, and (2) moral reasoning is often the servant of moral intuitions, making it difficult for people to challenge their own intuitions. Sunstein's argument is sound, but policy makers are likely to resist.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X05330093
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